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Pollock et al.: Tax Law

TAX LAW
I.

CONTRACT RENTAL VALUE IS INCLUDED IN PROPERTY

VALUATION FOR Ad Valorem TAX ASSESSMENT

In South Carolina Tax Commission v. South Carolina Tax
Board of Review1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled
upon the novel issue of what factors are determinative in the
valuation of property for ad valorem tax purposes. In holding
that the contract rental value of a lease is one of the determinative factors of the market value of property, 2 the court of appeals places South Carolina in accordance with the majority of
other jurisdictions.
The controversy in this case arose over the effect given to a
long-term lease in the determination of property values for ad
valorem tax assessment. The respondent, a general partnership,
owned an office building in Columbia, South Carolina, and
leased approximately sixty-one percent of the building's available space to Southern Bell under several long-term leases.' Pursuant to statute, 4 the petitioner, South Carolina Tax Commission, initially appraised the value of the property, for tax
purposes, at $2,330,000. This appraisal placed no value upon the
leases or contract rents that were derived from the property.'
Following an administrative hearing and subsequent appeal to
the Tax Board of Review, the Tax Board fixed the fair market
value at $1,596,500.6 The Tax Commission appealed the decision
to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas and to the
South Carolina Court of Appeals. Both courts affirmed the decision of the Tax Board.
The decision of the court of appeals centered on defining

1. 287 S.C. 415, 339 S.E.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1985).
2. Id. at 419, 339 S.E.2d at 133.
3. Record at 5.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-3-140(7), 12-43-220(a) (1976 & Supp. 1985).
5. Record at 1.
6. 287 S.C. at 417, 339 S.E.2d at 132. This valuation considered the fair market
value in light of the leases encumbering the property.
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terms contained in South Carolina Code section 12-37-930,1
which deals with property valuation. This statute requires that
the tax value of property shall be the property's "true value in
money," defined as "the market value between a willing buyer
and seller."8 The court defined market value as being the same
for tax purposes as for sales purposes.9 Because purchasers or
investors would consider a long-term lease and the rents accruing under this lease when valuing property for sales or investment purposes, the court held that for income-producing commercial real estate, a lease and the actual income to be derived
under this lease should be a determinative factor in assessing tax
value.
In defining factors determinative of market value, the court
of appeals addressed an issue never before directly answered by
the courts in South Carolina. Article X, section 3(a) of the South
Carolina Constitution states that "all property .

.

. shall be

value." 10

Taxes, however, must be laid,
taxed in proportion to its
not upon the property itself, but upon the actual value of the
property as ascertained by an assessment for tax purposes.11
Only a few cases have dealt with factors that determine value for
purposes of taxation.' 2 Although relevant factors have been held
1 3 these releto be mandatory for consideration of actual value,
14
vant factors have not been defined previously.
Although no South Carolina case has-dealt with the issue of
rental value affecting tax valuation, other jurisdictions that have

7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-930 (Supp. 1985).
8. 287 S.C. at 419, 339 S.E,2d at 133. Section 12-37-930 also requires that neither
party act under compulsion and that they be "reasonably well informed" of the present
and potential uses of the property. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-930 (Supp. 1985).
9. 287 S.C. at 419, 339 S.E.2d at 133.
10. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3(a). Although this section of the Constitution is not cited
by the court, it is often cited in other cases dealing with tax valuation. See, e.g., S.C. Tax
Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd., 278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489 (1983); Meredith v. Elliott, 247
S.C. 335, 147 S.E.2d 244 (1966).
11. State v. Cheraw & D.R.R., 54 S.C. 564, 32 S.E. 691 (1898).
12. One factor contributing to the lack of judicial decision is found in the Administrative Procedures Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(f) (Supp. 1985), which confines review
of administrative decisions, like those of the Tax Board, to the record developed in the
administrative hearings.
13. S.C. Tax Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd., 278 S.C. at 561, 299 S.E.2d at 492.
14. A lease is a factor to be considered in determination of value for ad valorem
taxes. 1969 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 4, No. 2610. No South Carolina case, however, is cited by
the Attorney General to support this proposition.
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addressed this issue generally agree that actual or potential income from a lease will affect market value and, therefore, should
be considered in tax valuation. 15 Some disagreement, however,
arises over whether actual income from rents or potential income capacity of the property should be used to determine tax
value. By holding that the actual, and not the potential, value of
a lease is one of the determinative factors, the court of appeals
has placed South Carolina in accordance with a plurality of
other states.'6 Like the South Carolina Tax Board court, several
states also recognize that the capitalization of income method is
relevant in the determination of value for tax purposes.17
The decision of the court of appeals in this case brought
clarity to the issue of ad valorem tax valuation. Upon rehearing,
however, the court unfortunately broke away from taxation issues and viewed the controversy as arising over "the weight of
the evidence."' 8 Although this may seem to weaken the impact
of the decision, the court specifically stated that the existence of
a lease and the consideration deriving from this lease is "an element to be considered" for valuation purposes. 19 This reemphasizes the original decision. Because the decision was affirmed,
the attempt to change the focus from tax issues to evidentiary
issues should not affect the impact of this decision upon South
Carolina law.
William W. Pollock

II.

SITUS OF COPYRIGHTS DETERMINED

In Pendarvis v. South Carolina Tax Commission" the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the price of a copy-

15. See generally Annotation, Income or Rental Value as a Factorin Evaluation of
Real Propertyfor Purposes of Taxation, 96 A.L.R.2D 666 (1964).

16. See id. Twenty-four states have held that actual income from rents is a factor,
twenty-three have held that potential value should be considered, and nine states have
ruled both ways.
17. See, e.g., Bornstein v. State Comm'n, 227 Md. 331, 176 A.2d 859 (1962); People
ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v. Miller, 287 N.Y. 126, 38 N.E.2d 465 (1941).
18. 287 S.C. at 421, 339 S.E.2d at 134.
19. Id. at 421, 339 S.E.2d at 134. The original decision held this to be a determina-

tive factor. Id. at 419, 339 S.E.2d at 133.
20. 285 S.C. 381, 329 S.E.2d 766 (1985).
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righted motion picture could be amortized and deducted in
South Carolina although the film itself was never physically present within the State. In so holding, the court adopted the general rule regarding the situs of intangibles.'
Pendarvis purchased the copyrights to two motion pictures
for investment purposes and immediately granted an exclusive
license to an out-of-state distributor in exchange for a percentage of the royalties. 22 Although Pendarvis had full ownership of
the films and the copyrights in South Carolina, neither the motion pictures nor copies of them were used or physically located
in South Carolina during 1977. Pendarvis sought to take a depreciation deduction for the movies on his 1977 tax return. The
Tax Commission disallowed the deduction characterizing it as
an ordinary business loss from an out-of-state business activity
rather than an amortization of a capital asset.23
In rendering its opinion, the supreme court reasoned that a
copyright is intangible property, entirely distinct from the tangible object it protects, 24 and that "[t]he situs of a copyright is the
domicile of its holder. ' 25 Based upon these observations and a
characterization of the copyright as a capital asset,26 the court
ruled that the deduction was properly taken in South Carolina.
In Seward v. South Carolina Tax Commission2s the supreme court had announced the standard that losses generated
by investment activity could not be deducted in South Carolina
unless gain from such activity would be taxable in South Carolina.29 Prior to 1977, statutory law would have allocated any income generated by the copyright to South Carolina. Therefore,

21. 71 AM. JuR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 666 (1973).

22. Record at 7.
23. 285 S.C. at 382-83, 329 S.E.2d at 767.
24. Id. at 383, 329 S.E.2d at 767.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 383, 329 S.E.2d at 768.
28. 269 S.C. 52, 236 S.E.2d 198 (1977).
29. Id. at 58, 236 S.E.2d at 200.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(3) (1976) allocated to South Carolina royalties from
copyrights "(a) [if and to the extent that the ... copyright is utilized by the taxpayer

in this State, or (b) [i]f and to the extent that the.

.

.copyright is utilized by the tax-

payer in a state in which the taxpayer is not taxable and the.. . individual taxpayer's
domicile is in this State." The statute further provided that "[i]f the basis of receipts
from copyright royalties does not permit allocation to states or if the accounting procedures do not reflect state of utilization, the copyright is utilized in the state in which...
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under Seward the deduction would have met with little or no
resistance. However, the Seward standard was deleted from the
tax code in a move designed to "further allow apportionment of
income to this state,

'31

leaving sections dealing with interest re-

ceived from intangible property 2 and gains or losses from sales
of intangible property.3 3 Neither of these sections applied since
Pendarvis dealt with royalties. Without the language of the pre1977 tax law, the court reached the same result by relying upon
the common-law notion
that the situs of a copyright is the domi34
cile of its holder.

In holding that the cost of a copyrighted film may be depreciated by a South Carolina taxpayer, the supreme court clarified
an area of law that is particularly confusing. Because of the
brevity of the court's opinion, however, it may be desirable for
the legislature to adopt language clearly defining the tax consequences for the ownership of copyrighted materials.
Dean A. Eichelberger

III. STATUTORILY CREATED BOARD MAY DENY TAx-EXEMPT
STATUS ON CERTAIN CHURCH PROPERTY

The tax-exempt status of an unused portion of church property was the catalytic issue in Westview Baptist Church v.
Rembert.3 5 From that issue, two subsidiary issues evolved: The
viability of the Charleston County Tax Exempt Board and its
authority to revoke exemptions. The court of appeals ruled that
the Board was viable and possessed the authority to revoke exemptions and that the Board had correctly exercised that authority in revoking the tax-exempt status of thirteen unused

an individual taxpayer's domicile is located." Id. Since Mr. Pendarvis granted an exclusive license to the film distributor in exchange for a percentage of the royalties and those
payments would not reflect state of utilization, any gains would be allocated to South
Carolina. The practical result under old § 12-7-1120(3) is that there would be a presumption that the situs of the copyright is the holder's domicile.
31. 1977 S.C. Acts 62, No. 49.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(1) (1976 and Supp. 1985).
33. Id. § 12-7-1120(5).
34. 285 S.C. at 383, 329 S.E.2d at 767.
35. 286 S.C. 30, 331 S.E.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1985).
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acres of Westview property. 6

Westview Baptist Church owned seventeen and one-half
acres of Charleston County land for which the church had been
granted an agricultural use value assessment upon their request.
When the church sold the land, Charleston County levied an agricultural roll back tax amounting to $1900. The church then applied to the Charleston County Tax Exempt Board for complete
exemption from property taxes. The Board granted the exemption. Upon discovering that the first hearing had not been con37
ducted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act,

the Board held a second hearing despite Westview's objections.
The complete exemption, granted a little more than a month
earlier, was reduced to an exemption for only four and one-half
acres. Westview then appealed to the South Carolina Tax Commission, claiming that the Board had no authority to conduct
the second hearing and that the property was exempt. The Tax
Commission denied the claims and upheld the Board's decision.38 When the Commission denied the church's request for a
rehearing, Westview appealed to the Charleston County Circuit
Court. The circuit court affirmed the Tax Commission's decision
and Westview then appealed to the South Carolina Court of
Appeals."
The court first addressed the question of the Board's viability, noting that a special act created the Board.4 This special
act was not repealed by the enactment of section 12-3-145,1 a
general statute that placed the responsibility for making exemptions on the South Carolina Tax Commission. The court then
found that Act No. 148942 amended Act No. 49443 and granted

revocation of authority to the Board." It appears that there is
no limitation on the frequency of Board review of property
status.
36. Id. at 31, 331 S.E.2d at 383.
37. S.C. CoDE

ANN.

§ 30-4-80 (Supp. 1985).

38. 286 S.C. at 31-32, 331 S.E.2d at 384.
39. Record at 1-2. 286 S.C. at 32, 331 S.E.2d at 382.
40. 286 S.C. at 32, 331 S.E.2d at 384. See 1969 S.C. Acts 857, No. 494 (amended by
1971 S.C. Acts 1089, No. 587; 1972 S.C. Acts 2735, No. 1489; 1976 S.C. Acts 1655, No.
619).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-3-145 (Supp. 1985).

42. 1972 S.C. Acts 2735, No. 1489.
43. 1969 S.C. Acts 857, No. 494.
44. 286 S.C. at 32, 331 S.E.2d at 384.
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Finally, the court upheld the exemption revocation pursuant to South Carolina Code section 12-37-220A,45 which limits
church property exemptions to portions of land "actually occupied. ' 46 Although testimony conflicted, the Westview court
found it sufficient to support a determination of actual occupation of only four and one-half acres.
The opinion of the court of appeals is logical and concise. As
in the past, 47 the court construes statutes strictly against the
taxpayer. The court also provides specific guidelines to churches
who find themselves in a similar situation. First, a church must
be careful when filing for a certain tax status that the filing is
done correctly since a change of an initial decision at a later date
may not be an option. It should be noted, however, that since a
church primarily received the valuation it originally requested,
equity may have been a significant factor in the Westview decision. Second, a church should take steps to insure that the requirements set forth in South Carolina Code section 12-37-220
are met.48 Exemption statutes will probably continue to be construed strictly against the taxpayer.49 Third, a church should
raise all potential issues in the lower court. This case might have
provided some interesting South Carolina commentary on constitutional law if that issue had been raised at a lower level and
preserved on appeal. Last, a church should not look to the
courts to remedy confusion that results from the overlapping jurisdiction of statutorily created boards and commissions. Although it may be desirable to eliminate confusion and duplication, it would appear that the legislature, not the courts, must
initiate that change.
Nancy S. Rights

45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220A (1976 & Supp. 1985). This section was amended in
1978 to exempt all property of all churches from ad valorem taxation. 1978 S.C. Acts
1786, No. 621; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220A(1) (1976 & Supp. 1985).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220(8) (1976).
47. Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 281 S.C. 242, 245, 315 S.E.2d 112, 113
(1984); Berry v. Weeks, 279 S.C. 543, 546, 309 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1983); Strickland v. State,
276 S.C. 17, 21, 274 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1981).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
49. Hibernian Soc'y v. Thomas, 282 S.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1984).
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